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KAREN LARIE THOMPSON 
JOSEPH BLAINE THOMPSON 
Defendant and Appellant 
Priority No: 4 
R E P 1 
ON APPEAL FROM AN ORDER OF THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
JUDGE TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
Mitchell R. Barker 
349 South 200 East #170 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Appellee 
Daniel Darger 
1000 Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Ut 84111 
Telephone 801-531-6686 
Attorney for Appellant 
REPLY TO APPELLEE'S "STATEMENT OF ISSUES" 
As noted in the case of Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 512 
(1989), it is the province of the Appellant to frame the issues on appeal, for "the party who 
brings a suit [or appeal] is master to decide what law he will rely upon. . . . " Appellant's 
"Statement of Issues" bears little resemblance to the issues raised by Appellant and appears 
to be an attempt at cross-appeal. The statement should be ignored. 
REPLY TO APPELLEE'S "STATEMENT OF THE CASE" AND "COURSE OF 
PROCEEDINGS" 
Appellee is correct at Br. 1 in stating that this is an appeal from the denial of a 
motion by Appellant seeking to set a custody decree aside. However, the remainder is little 
more than argument, based upon misstatements of fact and fabrication, and should be 
disregarded. 
ARGUMENT 
Appellee raises 25 points of argument in his response brief, many of them redundant. 
Points 2., 3., 4., 10., 20., and 21. all involve Appellee's claim that this appeal was not 
timely filed. These are the same issues that were raised and briefed in Appellee's Motion to 
Dismiss for Want of Jurisdiction and require no further reply except to point out that 
Appellee continues to make arguments in his brief that were not warranted by law and were 
frivolous when made in his motion to dismiss. However, he now has the benefit of 
Appellant's reply to his motion, and if he didn't know the law then, he sure did when he 
prepared his response brief. 
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Point 9. also appears to be an attack on the timeliness of appeal not raised in 
Appellee's Motion to Dismiss. Appellee seems to be arguing that Mr. Kimball's affidavit 
and testimony is not newly discovered evidence and therefore the Rule 59 Motion to Alter or 
Amend was not effective in tolling the time for appeal. 
He cites no law for this proposition and totally ignores the case law readily available 
in the annotations to this rule. All hold that a timely motion under Rule 59 U.R.C.P. 
terminates the running of the time for appeal, and time does not begin to run again until the 
order granting or denying such order is entered, (e.g. Hume v. Small Claims Court, 590 P.2d 
309 [Utah 1979]; Interstate Land Corp. v. Patterson, 797 P.2d 1101 [Utah Ct. App, 1990]) 
Not a single Utah case holds that the time for appeal is tolled only if the trial court 
finds that the Rule 59 motion is well taken, as Appellee suggests (Appellee Br. pp. 26, 27). 
Such an interpretation would place counsel at risk of malpractice every time a Rule 59 
motion was filed unless notice of appeal was filed within 30 days of the original judgment 
regardless of the outcome of the motion. This argument is frivolous. 
At Point 6. (Appellee Br. p. 22), Appellee argues that Appellant is barred by the "law 
of the case" from the relief sought herein. No cases are cited or evidence marshalled as to 
how the law of the case applies. Instead, Appellee cites cases holding that a party must 
show a "substantial change of material circumstances" before a decree can be modified. 
Appellee ignores the fact that this is not an attempt to modify the decree and the cases cited 
by Appellee are totally irrelevant. 
Appellee argues at Point 7. (Appellee Br. p. 22) that Appellant had a chance to 
protect herself (presumably from Mr. Kimball's conduct) during the trial of this case and that 
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she failed to do so by failing to call Mr. Kimball as a witness. Further, he argues at Point 
23 (Appellee Br. 43) that deference should be accorded the trial judge on this issue (of 
awarding custody). 
Ignored is the fact that the "trial" was actually an evidentiary hearing solely on the 
issue of modifying visitation from supervised to unsupervised. Other issues were not before 
the trial court and not relevant. Further, as pointed out below, the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law are so insufficient that one is unable to determine why the trial court 
awarded custody to Appellee. So how can this unknown determination be given deference? 
This argument is without merit. 
At Paragraph 8. (Appellee Br. p.25) the laches argument is made. Appellee argues 
that Appellant's "delay" in pursuing an order setting the decree aside was unreasonable. 
However, the record shows no delay. For upon retaining new counsel on May 4, 1992, 
(Attachment A of Appellant's Brief), a motion to set the decree aside was prepared and filed 
on May 26, 1992.(Rec. 658-704, 707-708) Further, as set out below, she did not learn that 
a default decree had been entered until the end of January, 1992, at which time she was 
again relying upon Mr. Kimball. 
Appellee's claim that the delay between filing the motion to set aside and the courts 
eventual ruling should be attributed to Appellant, is like the pot calling the kettle black.. 
(Appellee Br. p. 26) Appellant has no control over the trial court's schedule. She filed a 
timely notice to submit her motion for decision on June 16, 1992 (Rec. 745) And on June 
17, 1992, Appellee filed an objection to the notice to submit, arguing that the court had 
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previously determined that Appellant's motion to modify the visitation provisions should be 
resolved before the court acted upon the motion to set it aside. (Rec. 747-748) 
And, several days later, Appellee got around to filing a response to the motion to set 
aside (Rec. 749-759); followed by Appellant's motion to strike the objection and responsive 
brief (Rec. 761-768); followed by Appellee's Amended Response to Motion to Set Aside 
(Rec.814-824); followed by Appellant's motion to strike the amended response. (Rec. 825-
826) (The memo in support of this motion does not appear in the record for some reason and 
is attached hereto as Attachment A) 
A cursory examination of the above documents will reveal that it was Appellee who 
was trying to delay the trial court's ruling on the motion to set aside, not Appellant. Further, 
this examination will reveal a pattern followed by Appellee throughout this entire litigation of 
ignoring the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and twisting facts to meet his purposes. (Not to 
mention the impropriety of Attachment C of Appellee's Brief) And, Appellee is clearly 
trying to mislead this court as well. 
Points 1., 5., 15., 16., and 17. of Appellee's brief are all based upon a claim that 
Appellant's answer was withdrawn and the default decree entered against her as a result of 
her stipulation that it be done. Appellee's proof of a stipulation consists of Appellant's 
infamous letter of November 4, 1991 (Rec. 410-413; Appendix A of Appellee's Brief) and 
Mr. Kimball's signature approving the findings of fact, conclusions of law and decree. 
However, a review of the November 4th letter indicates absolutely no basis for the 
misdeeds perpetrated upon Appellant on November 12th and 13th of 1991. And when 
reviewed together with the affidavit of Mr. Kimball (Rec. 1380-1383) as well as the 
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testimony of the parties set out below, it is clear that there was no meeting of the minds, no 
knowing waiver of rights, and no authority for Mr. Kimball to do what he did. Finally, the 
trial court's minute entry of November 12, 1991 (Rec. 414) indicates on its face that the 
custody arrangement discussed in the telephonic scheduling conference was a temporary 
arrangement indicating that it was "until such time the Defendant has resolved her problem." 
(Rec. 414) 
Attempts by Appellee, and the trial court, to justify what occurred the following day 
on the basis of the November 4th letter is horribly misplaced. For this letter was intended as 
a personal communication to Appellee, the father of Appellant's only child, not for the 
benefit of the attorney's or the court! (Rec. 2175) Appellant's expressions of frustration and 
resignation made in a personal letter to Appellee hardly rise to the level of a stipulation or a 
settlement agreement. Instead, this letter reflects Appellant's repeated refusal to sign off on 
Appellee's settlement demands and states "I am not giving up and neither is my family." 
(Rec. 411) Yet, seven days later, Appellee managed to twist this personal letter into a 
stipulation for withdrawing Appellant's answer and counterclaim, and entering a default 
decree against her while Mr. Kimball stood lamely by. (Appellee Br. p.35: "This letter 
constitutes a default") This is hardly justice. 
Appellee argues at Points 11. and 12. that the Findings supporting the award of 
custody were adequate because (1) custody was not at issue (Appellee Br. p. 28, 29) and, (2) 
adequate findings were incorporated by reference in the form of the so-called custody 
evaluation of Patricia Smith, Phd. (Appellee Br. p. 29-34) However, regardless of the 
number of facts Appellee incorporated into the findings and conclusions by reference, they 
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have a fatal flaw in that they never explain why the trial court felt one parent better than the 
other. They simply fail to articulate a rational factual basis for the ultimate decision by 
reference to pertinent factors that relate to the best interests of the child. Sanderson v. 
Tryon, 739 P.2d 623 (Utah 1987) 
Appellee cites the case of Ebbert v. Ebbert, 744 P.2d 1019 (Utah App. 1987) 
[Specific findings are not required where custody is not an issue.] in support of his 
contention that the findings were adequate in the instant case. He argues that custody was 
not an issue in the instant case because it had been resolved by the supposed "stipulation" 
(the November 4th letter and Mr. Kimball's agreement to the findings)* 
However, the Ebbert case is not applicable because custody was, and is, the only 
issue, and hotly contested in the instant case. Appellant filed an answer and counterclaim 
seeking custody (Rec. 299-302) And just prior to the entry of the default decree, she was 
resisting attempts by Appellee and Mr. Kimball to get her to sign stipulations giving 
Appellee custody. (Rec. 2169) As Appellee's attorney, Mr. Barker stated: 
...it's been broached the fact that there's been several attempts at stipulation, and 
none of them included supervised visitation. Lest the court be misled into thinking 
it's (supervised visitation) some kind of a punishment later, we need to establish 
through these documents that she refused to even sign the very most basic two 
paragraph stipulation. She wouldn't put her signature on anything. (Rec. 2066-2068) 
And Appellee testified: 
[Exhibit] thirteen is the settlement stipulation, a final settlement stipulation with my 
signature on it, dated the 5th day of November, 1991, (8 days before the default 
decree was entered) which was the product of five successive weeks of weekly 
meetings between myself, yourself, Chase Kimball, attorney for Karen Thompson, 
Karen Thompson, and Deborah's guardian ad litem, Arnold Gardner; and also 
countersigned by the custody evaluator, Patricia Smith. (Emphasis added) 
Q. And the shorter one, the second one, which would be thirteen, I guess? 
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A. Yes. It's a two paragraph stipulation, merely saying that John Putvin shall 
receive sole permanent custody; Karen shall receive minimum standard visitation. 
(Rec. 2067-2068) 
* * * 
Q. (By Mr. Barker) Mr. Putvin, those stipulations and the unwillingness to 
sign them on Karen's part, why does that have anything to do with your concern that 
there's a flight risk, and there should be supervised visitation? 
A. Well, first, in her deposition as has been entered in this record, she refused to 
hypothetically agree to some stipulation that if one party moved, the other would get 
custody. There was a great deal of ovation on that. Secondly, in this document it 
stipulates that either party, a physical move by either party would be considered a 
material change of circumstance, which would warrant a review of the custody 
arrangement. And she refused to sign that.[No kidding!] (Emphasis and editorial 
added) 
* * # 
Q. With regard to those stipulations, what should make Judge Hanson believe if 
anything that that concern is still real, there's still a concern that her refusal to sign 
those stipulations, or other activities in relation to the court indicate there's still a 
risk? 
A. She sent me, personally addressed to me, her November 4th letter, and in that 
she says I'm not giving up the fight, but I'm not going to fight the devil, ie, you. 
(Rec. 2069-2070) (Emphasis added) 
Appellee has also testified as to the vehemence with which Appellant contested 
custody, stating "...she's contested my name on the birth certificate, and Deborah's middle 
name, and has opposed vehemently any effort on my part to have that corrected." (Rec. 
2064) 
Appellant's uncontroverted testimony is: "Because Chase [Kimball] was insisting that 
I sign those other documents. As a matter of fact, he threatened me over the phone. And I 
could not accept the way he was going on it." (Rec. 2175) 
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In response to Mr. Barker's question: 
Now you have made some pretty serious accusations against Chase Kimball. Can you 
tell us what threat he made to you to get you to sign? He threatened you to try to get 
you to sign a stipulation, is that what you said? 
she testified: 
He was yelling at me in a very loud, and screaming voice over the phone, and he 
says, you had better sign that. He says you better call me back within five minutes 
with the answer to sign this, or you will loose your daughter, and you will be very, 
very, very sorry. And he kept saying that over and over, and was very, very 
threatening in his demeanor. (Rec. 2179) 
Approximately one week later, Mr. Kimball made good his threat. 
Thus, it is obvious that immediately prior to the supposed settlement which Appellee 
claims made custody a non-issue, Appellant was adamantly refusing to settle or stipulate 
away her claim to custody in spite of the threats of her own attorney! Thereafter, Appellee 
used the November 4th letter and the complicity of Appellant's counsel to not only obtain 
permanent custody, but an onerous visitation arrangement which effectively cut Appellant off 
from any meaningful relationship with her daughter. (The quote of Judge Hanson at 
Appellee Brf. p.23 is enlightening on how this was accomplished.) And, shortly thereafter, 
Appellee and the child moved to New Zealand. 
The above testimony is also enlightening as to the argument made by Appellee at 
Point 18. and 24. For, as Appellee admits at Brief 40-41, in January, 1992, when Mr. 
Kimball attempted to act on Appellant's behalf in this action, Appellee filed a Motion to 
Require Proof of Authority (Rec. 506-507) The obvious inference is that Appellee had 
reason to believe Mr. Kimball had been discharged from the case. 
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Mr. Kimball's affidavit in response to this motion (Rec. 499-500) does imply that his 
representation of Appellant had been continuous and unbroken up to that date and to this 
extent, is inconsistent with his later affidavit in support of the motion to amend. (Rec. 1380-
1383) However, this later affidavit is clearly against Mr. Kimball's interest in that it exposes 
him to civil suit for malpractice as well as professional disciplinary action. 
More importantly it corroborates the inference that Appellee knew of his lack of 
authority and provides a timeframe wherein Appellee obtained this knowledge (Before 
Kimball approved the findings and decree). He had absolutely nothing to gain and 
everything to lose in giving this affidavit and its credibility should be given great weight. 
Appellee's argument, that Mr. Kimball did represent Appellant at the time the decree 
was entered, misses the point. Whether he did or didn't, it is uncontroverted that he was not 
authorized by his client to withdraw her answer and counterclaim, enter into a stipulation on 
her behalf, approve findings of fact, conclusions of law or the entry of a default decree. In 
fact, he was specifically directed otherwise by his client. 
The uncontroverted testimony of Appellant is as follows: 
Q. When was the first time you saw that custody decree? 
A. If I've seen it, I think I have, if I've seen it, it was I went with you to the 
courthouse. 
Q. When was the first time you ever became aware of the custody decree? 
A. I believe it was toward the end of January, and I don't even remember how I 
found out, but I was very upset, and I called Chase, and raked him over the coals for 
it. 
Q. Did you ever authorize Mr. Kimball to withdraw your answer? 
A. Did I ever authorize? 
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Q. To withdraw your answer to this lawsuit, and let it go by default? 
A. No, I did not. 
Q. Did you ever authorize him to approve, or sign the Findings of Fact or that 
default decree? 
A. Absolutely not. In the first place, I didn't know there was a default decree 
going on. In the second place, he wanted me to sign one of these other things, and 
when I refused, he said, well then let me sign it. I said, absolutely not. If anybody 
signs it, it will be me, and you're not. (Rec.2170-2171) 
In any event, it is manifestly unjust to sanction Appellant for Mr. Kimball's duplicity 
and abandonment, or for bringing it to the trial court's attention. 
CONCLUSION 
It is obvious from the record that Appellant was unjustly denied a fair hearing on her 
claim to custody of her child. Instead, the misdeeds of Appellee and Appellant's attorney, 
Mr. Kimball, resulted in a default decree of custody which allowed Appellee and his other 
wife, to whisk the child away to New Zealand. Since that time, Appellant has had to swim 
up the stream of Appellee's numerous and meritless, motions, petitions, personal injury 
actions and all else that a bottomless pocket and a willing attorney can devise to vex her. 
This court should reverse the trial court's denial of Appellant's Rule 60(b) motion and 
remand this matter for a hearing on the issue of custody. Further, Appellant should be 
awarded attorney's fees for proceedings in the trial court and on appeal, pursuant to Rule 33, 
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U.R.A.P. and Rule 11, U.R.C.P. for the numerous frivolous pleadings filed by Appellant 
since May, 1992. 
DATED this 2£& day of 
DANIEL DARGER 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Reply Brief of 
Appellant has been hand delivered to Mitchell R. Barker. 349 South 200 East, Suite 170, 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111, this 3 0 day of . J M ^ M A . - . 1994. 
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ATTACHMENT A 
Daniel Darger (0815) 
Attorney at Law 
100 Commercial Club Building 
32 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-6686 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN CARL PUTVIN : 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
Plaintiff, : OF MOTION TO STRIKE 
vs. 
CivifNo: 910903188 CS 
KAREN LARIE THOMPSON, ET AL : 
Defendant : Judse: Hanson 
COMES NOW, Plaintiff by and through her attorney Daniel Darger. Esq., and hereby 
submits the above-entitled Memorandum. 
UNDISPUTED FACTS 
1. On May 26, 1992, Defendant served upon Plaintiffs counsel a motion and 
memorandum to set aside the default custody decree entered in this matter. (Exhibit A) 
2. On June 2, 1992, Defendant served upon Plaintiffs counsel an addendum to 
Defendant's memorandum in support of said motion. (Exhibit B) 
3. On June 16, Plaintiff had failed to file a responsive memorandum and on said 
date, Plaintiff filed a notice to submit. (Exhibit C) 
4. On June 17, 1992, Plaintiff filed an objection to the notice to submit. (Exhibit 
D) 
5. On June 18, 1992, Plaintiff mailed to Defendant a response memorandum to 
Plaintiffs motion to set aside. (Exhibit E) 
6. This Court has entered no order extending Plaintiffs time to respond nor has it 
entered an order staying the determination of Defendant's motion or otherwise delaying the 
decision on Plaintiffs motion. 
7. On June 26, Defendant received Plaintiffs Amended Response (Exhibit F) 
ARGUMENT 
L PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED RESPONSIVE MEMORANDUM IS UNTIMELY 
AND SHOULD BE STRICKEN 
Rule 4-501 is clear in its requirement that a responsive pleading shall be filed and 
served within ten days after service. The use of the mandatory word "shall" indicates that 
strict compliance is required. Moore v. Schwendiman, ^50 P.2nd 204 (Utah App. 1988) 
(Mandatory requirements must be complied with precisely) 
The appellate courts of Utah have consistently held that the procedural time 
requirements must be strictly complied with, unless a motion to extend the time is timely 
made, or upon motion and a showing of excusable neglect, as provided by Rule 6(b) U.R.C.P. 
The cites to these decisions are too numerous to include herewith considering the number of 
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different rules to which they relate; e.g. Rule 12 (answer), rule 52 and 59 (motion for new 
trial), appellate Rule 4, etc. 
While the appellate courts in Utah have yet to rule on directly on this issue, the Court 
of Appeals has indicated in dicta that a responsive memorandum must be timely for it to be 
considered in ruling on a motion. In the case of Gillmore v. Cummings, 806 P.2nd 1205 
(Utah App 1991), the court reversed an order of summary judgment because it was entered 
prior to the expiration of the ten day period for filing a responsive memorandum. The court 
stated: "...the trial court should have considered such a response, if timely received, before 
ruling on the motion to strike and the summary judgment motion." (emphasis added, at page 
1208) 
Plaintiff was served with Defendant's motion on May 26, 1992 and the response 
would have been due on June 8th, with the three day mailing period included. Defendant 
served her addendum on Plaintiff on June 2, 1992 and Plaintiff waited an additional thirteen 
days after this date to file the notice to submit. Thus, Plaintiff had at least twenty one days 
in which to prepare a response, which he failed to do. Thus, the filing of an amended 
responsive memorandum thereafter, is untimely and this court should strike this pleading as 
not complying with Rule 4-501. 
The alleged basis for Plaintiffs objection and the late filing of his memorandum and 
amendment should be of substantial concern to this court. As the Court will recall, it noted 
Defendant's motion to set aside while in chambers prior to the beginning of the evidentiary 
hearing on Defendant's motion to modify visitation, he Court commented that a decision of 
the motion to set aside may make the evidentiary hearing moot. However, Plaintiff states in 
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his objection that this Court "stated that Defendant's earlier motion, to modify the visitation 
provisions of the decree, should be determined before the instant motion is considered." 
(Exhibit D) And in his memorandum, Plaintiff argues that his responsive memorandum is not 
yet due because the courts comment referred to above somehow had the effect of staying 
Defendant's motion to set aside, or tolling or extending the time within which Plaintiff is 
required to answer. As this court is aware, Plaintiffs position has absolutely no basis in fact 
or law. 
To begin with, it defies logic and reason as to why this court would stay the decision 
on a motion that may make a prior motion moot until the prior motion can be decided. If 
anything, reason would dictate that it be the other way around. More importantly, this Court 
entered no such order and no motion for such an order has been filed. Assuming the fact that 
Plaintiffs counsel is a licensed member of the Bar, he is presumed to know that the alteration 
of time requirements set by procedural rules can only be done upon stipulation or motion 
properly brought before the court, and not by the courts spontaneous comment in chambers. 
If he is not so aware. Rule 11 would require that he make inquiry. Instead of filing a Rule 
6(b) motion, and providing a showing of excusable neglect, Plaintiff simply ignores the law 
and files his memorandum. 
Of equal concern is Plaintiffs outright misrepresentation of the facts. The comment 
in chambers as recalled by this counsel was not as Plaintiff represents. However, Defendant 
will leave it to the court to construe its own comments. Suffice it to say that this does not 
amount to excusable neglect where, subsequent to the comment in chambers, Plaintiff was 
served with 
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Defendant's addendum to the memorandum, clearly indicating that Defendant had no illusions 
that her motion to set aside was not proceeding forward. 
For the reasons above stated, Plaintiff respectfully request that this Court disregard 
Plaintiffs amended memorandum in ruling upon Plaintiffs motion to set aside the default 
decree. Further, this court should strike said pleadings from the record as untimely. 
Dated th day of /1M 
DANIEL DARGER 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum in 
Support of Motion to Strike has been mailed, postage prepaid to Mitchell R. Barker, 2870 
South State Street, Salt Lake City, UT 84115-3692. this ' lU dav of~3X)Q-*— , 
1992. 
J f>^Hvi^P. ' QftV>>,h i -e=^-
GlOmotpri 
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EXHIBIT A 
Daniel Darker (0815) 
Attorney at Law 
100 Commercial Club Building 
32 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake'City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)533-6686 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN CARL PUTVIN 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KAREN LARIE THOMPSON, ET AL 
Defendant 
MOTION TO SET ASIDI 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
' f-f* 
Civil No: 910903188 CS 
Judsre: Hanson 
Motion is hereby made for an order setting aside the default custody decree entered in 
the above matter by this Court on November 13, 1991. Tnis motion is made pursuant to Rule 
60 (b) (5) in that said judgment is void to the extent that it provides relief different in kind 
from or exceeding that specifically prayed for in plaintiffs complaint or to the extent that 
said decree goes beyond the actual decision of this Court. 
Further, this motion is made pursuant to Rule 60 (b) (7) in that said decree is 
"improper, or illegal, and voidable." ( P & B Land. Inc v Klungen'fc. 751 P.2nd 274 [UL CL 
App. 1988] at page 277) 
Basis for this motion is more particularly set out in defendant's memorandum in 
support hereof, attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference. 
Dated ±i^Z2h' day of ~HTA/£ fUA r^v . 1992. 
Daniel Darger 
Anorney at Law 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE"* 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that 2 true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion has been 
mailed, postage prepaid to Mitchell R. Barker.2870 South State Street, Salt Lake City, UT 
84115-3692, ifais^lU day of _ £ C ^ i i - 1992. 
\5 
GlmoLpri 
For the reasons above suited, defendant respectfully requests that this Court set aside 
the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Custody Decree previously entered. 
Dated this . day of _. 1992. 
DANIEL DARGER 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum 
has been mailed, postage prepaid to Mitchell R. Barker.2870 South State Street, Salt Lake 
City, UT 84115-3692, this P l y dav of T W \ . \ A . 1992. 
GlOmot.pri 
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EXHIBIT B 
1 
I 
• 
Oaniel Darger (0815) 
Auorncy at Law 
]00 Commercial Club Building 
32 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City. Uiah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-6686 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN CARL PUTVIN 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KAREN LARIE THOMPSON, ET AL 
Defendant 
ADDENDUM TO DEFENDANT'S 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION TO SET ASIDE 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
Civil No; 910903188 CS 
Judce: Hanson 
COMES NOW, Defendant by and through her attorney Daniel Darger. Esq., and 
hereby submits the above-entitled Memorandum. 
UNDISPUTED FACTS 
1. Defendant realleges and incorporates herein the facts set forth in her 
Memorandum in Suppon of Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment on file herein. 
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A mere finding that the panics arc or arc not ' fit and proper persons to be 
awarded the care, custody and control" of the child cannot pass muster when the 
custody award is challenged and an abuse of the trial court's discretion is urged on 
appeal. (Martinez v. Maninei. 728 P.2nd 994 [Utah 1986] at page 994.) 
This exactly the instant case. The findings merely recite that Plaintiff is a fit and 
proper person to be awarded custody. There is no finding as to what would be in the best 
interest of Deborah. And. in fact, this court could not malce the required findings based upon 
the evidentiary record as it is. Tnere has been no evidentiary hearing to allow the court to 
hear and weigh evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses, nor is there a stipulation signed 
by the panics as to what those facts are. Since the custody issue was not tried upon the facts, 
there is simply no evidence for the court to sift in determining the best interests of Deborah 
and, thus, the findings should be set aside as clearly erroneous. 
For the additional reasons above stated. Defendant respectfully request that this Court 
set aside the findings of fact, conclusions of law and custody decree heretofore entered. 
Dated this , • 2**l cav of / lUl^C^ . 19992. 
a X?r^ 
"D.^ELD.SGER ~ \ \ 
ATinmtv for Plaintiff ttorney
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum 
has been mailed, postage prepaid to Mitchell R. Barker.2870 South State Street. Salt Lake 
City. UT 84115-3692. this ' £~ cav of ~ " 3 U " - ^ . 1992. 
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Daniel Darker (0815) 
Attorney for Defendant 
100 Commercial Club Building 
32 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-6686 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN CARL PUTVLN 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KAREN LARIE THOMPSON 
Defendant 
NOTICE TO SUBMIT 
Civil No: 910903188 CS 
Judge: Timothy R. Hanson 
TO THE CLERK OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH: 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE, pursuant to Rule 4-501(l)(d) of the Utah Rules of Judicial 
Administration, that all papers to be filed in support of Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default 
Judsment have been filed, and Defendant reauests that this be submitted for decision. 
DATED this \L day of ^ «>»../ . 1992. 
DAKEL DARGER 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
u K X H E ! ^ B Y C E R T I F Y that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Notice to Submit 
1992. 
VC r j r r_ t - r\^\ :xn^ i i r^\ 
Exhibit D 
Mitchell R. Barker, #4 53 0 
Attorney for Defendant 
2870 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115-3 692 
Telephone (801) 486-9638 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN CARL PUTVIN, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
NAREN LARIE THOMPSON, et al., 
Defendants. 
OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S 
NOTICE TO SUBMIT 
Civil No. 910903188CS 
Judge Hanson 
Plaintiff John Carl Putvin ("John"") comes now and 
respectfully objects to the "Notice to Submit" filed by defendant 
Karen Thompson ("Karen") on or about June 16, 1992. The l^ otice is 
premature and contrary to the direction given by the Court. 
Defendant herself has filed a Petition to Change Custody in 
the action, which is still pending. An evidentiary hearing was 
held on that motion on Kay 27 and 28, 1992. The third day of the 
hearing on her motion is scheduled for July 7, 1992. 
At the two day hearing, the Court acknowledged defendant's 
motion attacking the original decree, and szated that defendant's 
earlier motion, to modify the visitation provisions of the decree, 
1 
should be determined before the instant motion is considered. 
For some reason Plaintiff's counsel has no copy of defendant's 
memorandum in its files. On this date the undersigned has obtained 
a copy of the memorandum from the office of defense counsel. In 
the event the Court desires briefing of the matter now, the 
plaintiff should be permitted an opportunity to brief this very 
serious matter prior to submission for decision. 
Respectfully submitted this 17th day of June, 1992. 
Mitchell R. Barker 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a copy of the foregoing to be 
mailed to Daniel Dargerf Esq., on this 17th day of June, 1992, at 
100 Commercial Club Building, 32 Exchange Place, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84111. 
A/ 
Kitchell R. Barker 
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Mitchell R. Barker, '^4 53 0 
Attorney for Defendant 
287 0 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115-3 692 
Telephone (801) 486-9638 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN CARL PUTVIN, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
{AREN LARIE THOMPSON, et al., 
Defendants. 
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO SET ASIDE 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 910903188CS 
Judge Hanson 
Plaintiff John Carl Putvin ("Putvin") comes now and responds 
as follows to the "Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment" filed by 
defendant Karen Thompson ("Thompson"). 
INTRODUCTION 
Findings of Facr, Conclusions of Law and a Decree were entered 
by the Court only after defense counsel agreed to them, and then 
approved them by his signature. Even if her ninety day period 
within which to ask rhe Courr to consider setting aside the 
judgment had not already passed, her actions and those of her 
attorney waived any defect she might have otherwise claimed. 
1 
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Decree. What she really seeks is a modification of the decree, 
without following Pule 6-404, Utah Code of Jud. Admin., without 
showing changed circumstances and without following the clear 
procedural requirements and pre-conditions contained in the Decree. 
Par. 5. Since Thompson failed to appeal, she must move against 
the Decree by way of a petition to modify, showing changed 
circumstances. Anderson v. Anderson, 12 Utah 2d. 36, 3 68 P. 2d 2 64 
(1962) . 
Respectfully submitted this 18th day of June, 1992. 
Kitcneil R. .Barker 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on or about this eighteenth day of June, 
1922, I mailed a copy of the foregoing to Daniel Darger, Esq., 100 
Commercial Club Building, 3 2 Exchange Place, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111. 
Mitchell R. Barker 
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Exhibit F 
RECEIVED JUH
 2 s '8S2 
Mitchell R. Barker, #4530 
Attorney for Defendant 
2870 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115-3692 
Telephone (801) 486-9638 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN CARL PUTVIN, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CAREN LARIE THOMPSON, et al., 
Defendants. 
AMENDED RESPONSE TO 
MOTION TO SET ASIDE 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
Civil NO. 910903188CS 
Judge Hanson 
Plaintiff John Carl Putvin ("Putvin") comes now and responds 
as follows to the "Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment" filed by 
defendant Karen Thompson ("Thompson"). 
INTRODUCTION 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a Decree were entered 
by the Court only after defense counsel agreed to them, and then 
approved them by his signature. Even if her ninety day period 
within which to ask the Court to consider setting aside the 
judgment had not already passed, her actions and those of her 
attorney waived any defect she might have otherwise claimed. 
This response memorandum is actually not yet due. During the 
1 
entered upon the minutes of the court." 73 Am.Jur2d Stipulations 
Sec. 2 (1974) (footnote omitted, emphasis added); quoted with 
approval in BarJcer v. Brown, 744 P.2d 333, 335 (Utah App. 1987). 
CONCLUSION 
Thompson has no basis for relief from her voluntarily entered 
Decree. What she really seeks is a modification, without following 
Rule 6-404, Utah Code of Jud. Admin., without showing changed 
circumstances and without following the clear procedure and pre-
conditions in the Decree. Par. 5. Since Thompson failed to 
appeal, she must move against the Decree by way of a petition to 
modify, showing changed circumstances. Anderson v. Anderson, 12 
Utah 2d. 36, 368 P.2d 264 (1962). Yet she argues as if on appeal. 
Respectfully submitted this 18th day of June, 1992. 
Mitchell R. Barker 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on or about this eighteenth day of June, 
1992, I mailed a copy of the foregoing to Daniel Darger, Esq., 100 
Commercial Club Building, 32 Exchange Place, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111. 
Mitchell R. Barker 
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lie hail purchased the panties worn by E. In 
tlie picture. Mrs. Workman corroborated, 
(edifying tbut sho ilid not remember the 
picture being taken and that sbc bad never 
teen the picture or the panties before. Mr. 
Workman testified that be could not re-
member the picture being taken. Even 
though defendants knew that Kelly bad 
behaved inappropriately with E , much of 
the inappropiiate behavior that they knew 
about occurred in I!»87 and 1088 and the 
photograph was taken in 1986. Moreover, 
any know ledge of inappropriate behavior 
does not go to whether they knew the 
photo was being taken, nor at what angle 
and focus. Further, while Kelly did testify 
to sexually abusing E., be never testified to 
being sexually aroused by the photo in 
question nor of taking or possessing it for 
the purpose of being aroused, nor of telling 
defendants that the photo aroused liim. 
In abort, no evidence supports a conclu-
sion that defendants knew that E.'s but-
tocks were only partially covered moments 
before the photo was taken, that they 
knowingly allowed Kelly to take or possess 
the photo, or that they knew the photo was 
taken or possessed by Kelly for the pur-
pose of sexually arousing him. The State 
therefore failed to present any evidence on 
the intent element of the offense chare., d. 
Thus, the judge was justified in arresting 
the judgment on the basis that the facts 
proved did not constitute an offense. 
OIJSrilUCTION OF JUSTICE 
| 5 | The State charged Mrs. Workman 
with obstruction of justice in violation of 
Utah Code Ann | 7G 8-306 4 The requi 
site criminal intent is "with intent to hin-
der, prevent, or delay the discovery, appre-
hension, prosecution, conviction, or punish-
ment of another for the commission of a 
crime " 
4. Tlir l i i fofiuniii i i i th . i fg lnf M i l Woik inan t i l th 
vtol.ill.ui of Ui.ttt Lode Ann. f H * - J06 charges 
as fol lous: 
lli.«l on or a lwul Scj»lcinl>cr. J90S to Aii | i isl . 
| 9 * 9 . at the place nliMctald j l a ) | u n | . llic de-
fendants, as ra l l ies, with Inlcnl lu hinder, 
pi event, or tfcM)' llic dtKovciy. appichrnsioii, 
piosecution. convicllun or punishment of an-
Again, where either a trial or an appel-
late court, suhstitutea its judgment for thai 
of the jury, the verdict must be bused on 
evidence "so inherently Improbable that no 
reasonable mind could believe it." State v. 
Mycn. COG l\2il 260, 2fi3 (Utah I08U) (Wil-
kius, J. concurring) (citations omitted). Un-
der such ciicuuistanccs, an arrest of judg-
ment is appropriate. 
'I he State claims that Mrs. Workman ob-
structed justice because she knew that Kel-
ly was sexually abusing and exploiting E. 
and she deliberately withheld this informa-
tion from the police until after they con-
tacted her. The specific evidence relied on 
by the State is Mrs. Workman's knowledge 
that Kelly sent bras to E in late 1087 or 
early 1088, her receipt of the telephone call 
about the pool incident in the summer of 
1988, Kelly's statement that be wauled to 
marry E. made lu 1087, and the pcijod of 
daily long distance telephone calls for 
which there is no date. The State further 
claims that Mrs. Workman was motivated 
to obstruct justice because she shared with 
Kelly a joint account into which be deposit-
ed hundreds of dollars. 
Mis. Workman testified, and Kelly cor-
roborated that she handled each incident as 
It came up. Each time, she reprimanded 
Kelly, Informed him of the rules of her 
household mid warned him not to do it 
again. Kelly testified that he concealed his 
abuse fiom the Workmans. In April 1088, 
when the police informed Mrs. Woikuian 
that Kelly was under investigation, she 
readily provided the police with whatever 
evidence and information they requested. 
In fact, it was Mrs. Workman who, at the 
request of the police, searched her daugh-
ters' bedrooms, found the lingerie and the 
photographs and turned them over to the 
police, lloth Kelly and Mrs. Workman tes-
tified that the funds in the account were to 
pay for skating lessons for E., that Mrs. 
Workman never knew bow much money 
oilier for ihe c o m m l x l o n of • crime did pro-
la te ihe offender a meant for audit ing dis-
c o i d y or apprehension, obstruct by deception 
an>one f i o m pc i fnmi i i i f au a d thai inlglii 
lead to discovery, apprehension, prosecution 
or comic l ion of a pei«on. or conceal, alici or 
destroy physical evidence. 
GILLMOH t. CIIMMINCS 
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was In the account, and that she made only and conversion, 
one withdrawal of eighty five dollars. Fi-
nally, these Incidents occurred over a two 
and a half year period, during which time 
Mrs. Workman was Involved with the myri-
ad tasks of running a household of thii teen 
to fourteen |>eople plus guests. 
We agree with the trial court that Ihe 
evidence is inherently Improbable such that 
a reasonable mind could not conclude that 
In 1D8G and 1987 Mrs. Workman was aware 
that Kelly was sexually exploiting E. and 
that thereafter she hclj>cd him conceal the 
ciime until April 1988. Further, it Is Inher-
ently Improbatle that, even if she were 
aware of the abuse, the joint bank account 
would have motivated Mrs. Workman to 
conceal Kelly's abuse of her daughter. We 
therefore find that the trial court was justi-
fied in arresting Judgment against Mra. 
Workman because the facts proved did not 
Bup|>ort the offense charged. 
Affirmed. 
Utah J 2 0 5 
Hie Third District Court, 
Summit County. J. Dennis Frederick. J., 
granted summary Judgment for defen-
dants, and appeal was taken. The Court of 
Appeals, Greenwood, J., held that trial 
court Improperly granted luminary judg-
ment prior to time In which plaintiff was 
entitled to file response to defendants' mo-
tion to strike portions of bis affidavit op-
posing summary Judgment. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Judgment t^lfltf 
Trial court improperly granted summa-
ry judgment prior to time In which nonrnov-
ant was entitled to file response to mov-
ants' motion to strike portions of his affida-
vit opposing summary judgment. Judicial 
Administration Rule 4 601( 1Kb). 
BENCH and GREENWOOD, JJ., 
concur. 
Charles F. GILLMOR, Jr., rialnlliT 
and Appellant, 
I). Gilbert Alhay (argued), Salt Lake 
City, for plaintiff and appellant. 
Bruce A. Maak, Michael M. l-aler (ar-
gued), Salt U k e City, for defendants and 
respondents Garlick, I'clton A Valley Rank. 
Ix)well V. Stimmerhays, Murray, for de-
fendants and res|K>ndenls limberlake. 
Dennis M. Astill, Salt U k e City, for de-
fendant and respondent Valley Hank. 
flefnre RENCII, HILLINGS and 
GREENWOOD. JJ. 
Vel|li CUMAIINCS, Jeffrey K. Garlick. 
Janet K. Garlick. Peter Swmier. W. Al-
lan I'cllon, Timber Lakes Corporation, 
a Utnh corporation, Valley Rank and 
Trust Company as trustee for the W. 
Allan Triton Truat and for John Does 1 
through 48, Defendant* and Appellees. 
No. 890562-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Feb. 22, 1991. 
Roundary dispute WM brought, alleg-
ing, inter alia, unlawful detainer, trespass 
OPINION 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
Appellant Charles F. Gillmor, Jr. (Gill 
mor) appeals the grant of summary judg-
ment in favor of appellees Jeffrey K. and 
Janet K. Garlick (Ihe Gsrlicks), and W. 
Allan Pelton and Valley Rank and Trust 
Company as trustee for the W. Allan IVl 
ton Trust (Pelton). We conclude that the 
summary judgment was granted prema-
turely because Gillmor was not given ade-
quate time to res|>ond to appellees' motion 
to strike portions of his affidavit opposing 
summary ^ d g m e n t . Therefore, we re-
terse. 
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This dispute involve* neighboring parcels 
of laitil in Summit County. Old ltatu.h 
Itoad separates the land occupied by appel-
lees (tinlit ks and IVHon, to the west, from 
that occupied by (Jilhuor, to the east. In 
October IUH7, Oillmor filed a complaint 
alleging, in effect, that the record bound-
ary of hit properly actually extends across 
Old lUnrh Itoad. overlapping much of the 
properly occupied by appellees. He sought 
teli<f under theories of unlawful detainer, 
trespass, and conversion, among others. 
Appellees denied Oillmor's allegation, as-
set ling that under the property descrip-
tions iu the relevant warranty deeds to all 
thiec parcel's Old Itanch Hoad form* the 
record boundary between their laud ami 
(iilhuor'a. Appellees also asset ted that 
even if Oillmor's allegation about the prop-
erty overlap is correct, they had become 
the owneis of the disputed land through 
adverse possession In November 10HR, 
appellees moved for partial Biiinmnry judg-
ment, on their adverse possession claim. 
The summary judgment motion was ac-
companied by affidavits of the Oarh« ki and 
JYItoii, as well as that of the Cat licks' 
granlur, establishing the elements of ad-
verse possesion; namely, continuous occu-
pation of the land, with payment of all 
Uxes thereon, for seven years. Utah Code 
Ann. {{ 78 12 12 oud -12 I (1087). Copies 
of propeitv la* receipts for the land occu-
pied by appellees, going buck the requisite 
seven years from October 1987, were at-
tached lo the affidavit*. Certified copies 
of Summit County tax plats were id so sub-
mitted. The plats identify the land occu-
pied by appellees by the same identification 
numbers shown on their tax receipts. The 
plats also show Old Itanch Itoad as the 
boundary between land taxed to appellees 
and that taxed to (Jilhuor. 
Hespouding to the summary judgment 
motion, Oillmor alleged that hi 1086, he had 
paid the taxes on the I'elton parcel before 
1'elton. ami on the Carlitk parcel before the 
Oarlicks' grantor, thereby interrupting the 
necessary continuity of tax payments need-
ed to establish adverse possession. See 
J'UISOHS v. Andeison, (5i>0 l'.2d 635, 638 
(Utah 1081) Oillmor submitted a copy of 
his lORfi property tax receipt, confirming 
the timing of his 1086 tax payment. How-
ever, Oillmor's tax receipt is not for taxes 
paid under appellees' tax identification 
numbers. Instead, it hears the identifica-
tion number assigned to Oillmor on the tax 
plats, indicating that he is taxed only on 
land east of Old Itanch Itoad. 
Oillmor also contested the continuous oc-
cupation element of the Oarlicks' claim. 
He did this by stating iu his affidavit that 
he had been unaware, prior lo 1080, of 
fence rebuilding that the Oarlicks' grantor 
had completed in November l!»80. Accord-
ing to the affidavit of the Oarlicks' grant-
or, no buildings appeared on the Cat lick 
pioperly until a ham was completed hi 
November 1080; a home was completed 
and ocrnpied iu December 1081. Tellou, la 
his affidavit, stated that he had built a 
home mi (he land he occupies in 1076. ('.ill 
tour did not contest the continuous occupa-
tion element of Felton's adverse possession 
claim. 
The Oarlicks and Tcllon then filed a re-
ply memorandum and a motion to strike 
five paragraphs of Oillmor's affidavit o|t-
posiug summary judgment. Appellees ar-
gued lhat those paragraphs were nol based 
on Oillmor's personal knowledge, and did 
not contain admissible evidence, as re 
quired by Itule f>G(e), Utah Itules of Civil 
Pioceduie. The patagraphs included Oill 
mor'a claim that he had paid taxes on the 
Car lick and lYllon property, and his claim 
(hat he had been unaware of fencing 
changes on the Carlick propeiIy befotc 
1080. Appellees' reply memorandum and. 
motion to strike were filed on Januaiy 12, 
1080 On January 10, 1080. by minute 
entry, the trial court granted the motion to 
sti ike and granted summary judgment hi 
appellees' favor. There was no hearing on 
either the motion for summary judgment or 
the motion to strike. 
On January 25. 1080, Oillmor filed a "mo-
tion to reconsider" the summary judgment 
The primary ground for the motion was 
Oillmor's assertion that "there Is a genuine 
issue of fact as to where the Cat lick and 
Teltuu homes are located." However, dill 
mor also noted that the court had not given 
him ten da>s to respond to Hppellees' mo-
tion (o strike, as provided by Utah Code 
Jud Admin. 4-50|(I)(b). Oillmor filed a sec-
ond affidavit with his motion lo reconsider, 
modifying the stricken paragraphs of his 
fits! affidavit to claim personal knowledge 
of the facts alleged therein. In this affida-
vit, Oillmor also alleged, for Ihe first time, 
that Old Itanch Itoad, identified in his origi-
nal warranty deed as the boundary be-
tween his propeily and lhat of appellees, 
hail been moved "at least twice" since the 
execution of that deed, most recently hi 
1078. Oillmor also filed an affidavit of hi« 
surveyor, James West. West slated that 
he had surveyed (iilhuor'a land in August 
1087, and had determined that Oillmor's 
propei ty over lapped viilh lhat occupied by 
appellees. A map of the Oillmor properly, 
drawn from West's survey, was attached to 
West's affidavit. 
The Oarlicks and Pelton responded lo 
Oillmor's motion to rrmnsidir on February 
7, 1080. In their response memorandum, 
appellees contested Oillmor's and West's 
asset (ions that Oillmor's property extended 
across Old Itanch Itoad. arguing that 
West's survey imprnpctly relied on a metes 
and bod'tids description of Oillmor's proper-
ty, instead of the warranty deed description 
In Oillmor's chain of title, describing the 
roail as the boundary. 
Under Utah Code Jud.Admin. 4-f>01(l)(c). 
(iillmor had five days, as the moving party, 
to file a reply to appellees' memoiandtim. 
'Ihe trial court did not wait five da\s, how-
ever, but denied Oillmor's motion to rccott-
I. nillnior coucclly claims lh.il there I* • «llv 
puled Issue of fact concerning the location of 
llic ICCOMI boundaiy between his piopeily and 
lhat of appellees, at Is icfleclcd In his alllJavit 
and those of the surveyor. Ihis Issue, however. 
Is not maicilal vtlili tespccl to the question of 
windier appellees have satisfied the icqulie-
menls for ad\ cise possession, whiih uas the 
sole fiooml lor their summary Judgment mo-
tion. Indeed, the summary Judgment motion 
stalls with the assumption that the K.nlnV* nod 
I'clloii do In fjet occupy pio|»oty to vvhkh 
Gllliuoi holds reroid title. The line location of 
the tccord boundaiy has no beating on the 
•dvctse possession claim. However, hi ihe 
event ap|K.decs' adverse possesion defense 
fads, ihcy must addicss (lilhuui'i boundaiy line 
claim. 
OII.I.AIOit r. etlMMINCS 
riu.»Ao* r i.t nol ituo, A|.,*. tMti Ulah 1207 
alder hi a second minute entry, dated Feb-
runiy 7, 1089 and mailed to the parlies on 
February 9, 1080. The minute entry re-
flects that the court considered Ihe memo-
randa submitted in connection with the mo-
lion lo reconsider, but does not reveal 
whether the affidavits submitted by (iill-
mor with the motion lo reconsider were 
considered for their possible impact on the 
summary judgment. 
On February 10, Oillmor's re.*|»onse lo 
appellees' reply memorandum was filed 
with the trial court. This response memo-
randum was timely under Utah Code Jud. 
Admin. 4-f>01(!)). The memorandum was 
accompanied by a second affidavit by sur-
veyor James West, claiming that, tinder Ihe 
"metes and bounds description" of Oill-
mor's oiigiual warranty deed, West still 
cnmhid.d that Oillmor'a property over-
lapped nith that of appellees. Oillmor's 
response memorandum and the second 
West affidavit fell on deaf ears, however, 
the court having already denied the motion 
to reconsider. F inal judgment on the sum-
maty judgment order Has entered on 
March 22, 1080, and this appeal followed. 
issues 
Oillmor raises two issues on appeal. 
First, he contends that there is a genuine 
dispute as to the true location of the hound 
aty between Oillmor's propei ty and lhat of 
appellees.1 His second contention is lhat 
there is a material dispute as to whether 
appellees satisfied the tax payment element 
for adverse |tossession of the property they 
now occupy.1 
I. Utah Code Ann g 75 I? I? (1957) rrqolres 
rtmiiuuoos occupation and payment ol ta«c» on 
laud adversely claimed. 
In no rase shall advene po*»e*«lon t*- con-
sldcicd cMahtisWd ondn the pHuislons of 
any Ktllon of this code, imhss It sltall he 
shown that the land had Wen occupied and 
claimed lor I he ftcilnd of set en veais coolmu 
ously. and thai the paily, hi* piedercv«ois and 
ft anion have paid all laves vhi ih have hern 
levied and assessed upon stub land accoiding 
to law. 
fJilbnui's memoranda and affidavit* apparently 
diqmlc both the seven year coniimioui rxtnpa-
lion and lax pa) incut foi the Oat licks aud /or 
I'elton. 
1208 Wall HOC. IMCII ic m.roiur.n. 2d sr.nir.a 
We reverse because of procedural error, 
and not on cillirr issue liiltmor urines on 
appeal * 'therefore, we do nut address Ihc 
substantive issues (iillmor presents. 
ANALYSIS 
I'focedural Ertor 
Appellees' motion to strike parts of (Jill-
luoi's firM affidavit wax based on Utah 
It Ov P .r)ll(r) That rule provides that ill tt 
Miiinnary judgment motion, "|s)upport'ing 
And opposing affidavits shall he made on 
personal knowledge, shall set forth surh 
farts as would he admissible in evidence, 
and shall show affirmatively that the affi-
gnt is competent to testify hi (he matters 
Mated therein." 'Iho motion to strike was 
filed simultaneously with, hut separately 
from, appellees' reply memorandum siqv-
portiug their under ly iug summary judg-
ment motion. 
Ilecause appellees' Rule f>fi(c) objection lo 
Cilhuor's fust affidavit was framed as it 
separate, written motion to Mi ike, (Jillmor 
should have heeu given ten days to re-
«o<iod, as prescribed hy Utah Code .lud Ad 
mill 4 GOl(!)(!•) Additionally, herause the 
motion was served on (•'illmor hy mail, 
Utah It Civ P. 6(c) entitled him to an mhli 
tiunal Ihree da)s Therefore, herause the 
motion to strike was served on January 12, 
1!»H!>, Cilhunr should have heeu given until 
January 2f> to respond. 
(Iillmor could have responded lo the mo-
tion lo strike hy supplementing his affida-
vit to meet Itnlc !ifi(e) standards. Utah 
It Civ.P. 66(e) (court may permit parly In 
summary judgment motion to supplement 
j» I fid.iv ili with depositions, answers lo in-
ter rogatories, or further affidavits). He-
cause summary judgment is appropriate 
only when it is clear that no disputed issues 
of material fact exist, we believe that (Jill 
mor should have been allowed to respond 
to the motion in this fashion, and that the 
trial court should have coubidcred such a 
J. Although flilhnoi dij rtol Include piocedoial 
ei• or as a ha sis («ir »j<pral in his hiicf, he did 
aigoc the Issue ht-foie ihc liUl com I. We out-
sidrr ihc procedural Issue on ap|tca| for |«iof-
tiial reasons: we I K nuahlc lo dclrimhie horn 
the record hcfoic us uhal the court artoallv 
considered In gianting the summaiy judgment 
response, If timely received, before ruling 
' on the motion lo strike nnd the summary 
judgment motion. Il was error, however, 
to rule on the motions on January ID, six 
days hefore (lillmor's time to respond lo 
the motion to strike had expired. 
Gilhnor's motion to reconsider, anil (he 
Affidavits filed with that motion, were filed 
on January 2f», 1980. Under the combined 
operation of Utah Code Jud Admin. 4-
COIdX") and Utah II Civ P. 6(e), these ma-
terials would have heeu timely if they had 
hecn suhmitted ns it response to appellees' 
motion lo strike. (lillmor's motion lo re-
consider also directed the trial court's si-
lent ion to the prematurity of (he summary 
judgment tinder Utile I M>)(»)0') At that 
point, the trial court should have corrected 
the procedural prohlem with its summary 
judgment ruling hy reconsidering that rul-
ing in light of (lillmor'a Jaiionry 25 affida-
vits However, (he record does not reveal 
whether the trial court denied Ihc motion to 
reconsider upon study of Gillmor's January 
2f> affid-uits or, in denying the motion lo 
reconsider, disregarded those affidavits al-
Uv» ether. 
Ilecause the tiial court granted summary 
judgment prematurely under ft lie applicable 
procedural rules, itml because nothing in 
the record indicates that the court correct-
ed its procedural error when that error was 
called to its attention, the summary judg-
ment is set aside. See (hoco fishing & 
Mental Tools, Inc. v. Iiomrontl Explora-
tion. Inc., i:i6 P 2d 62, 62 61 (Utah tiHH); 
A'ft v lh niton. 718 P 2d f»H8, 6!>l (Utah 
Ct.App 11)88). We reverse nnd remand to 
the trial court for proceedings consistent 
with this opinion, r'ach party shall pay his 
or its own costs. 
HENCII nnd HILLINGS, JJ., concur. 
!? 
If 
*tlUIM> 
and driving ihc motion for reconsMei allon. 
l l i is is stnnt.ii lo rhosc cases vshrrc we remand 
for findings became wc are iniahlc to discern 
hum ihc record how the court irsohrJ malcrUl 
Issues. Sec At ton e. Dcliian. HI V 2J 996, 999 
(Utah 1957); Stale r. hn-fgig*. M V 2d W. • 
770-71 (Uuli C| A|.p 1990). J 
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I 
ILSaijji Divorce was sought. The Third Dis-
&'!|j! Irict Court, Salt Lake County, Frank <i. 
HJl i«, ^0 L ' ' •^• K™"(ed tlivorce, awarded alimony, 
ItJ'ltV and divided properly. Former wife appeal-
j ijS, cd. The Court of Appeals, (ireenwood, J., 
'VjJ i 'held thai: (I) tiial court erroneously looked 
'«'}: lo preseparatiorr standard of living in set* 
if'' ling alimony nnd should have considered 
jljjCij; standard of living dining marriage up to 
'«mF'|j i lime of trial approximately two years after 
ni i l^ •eparation; (2) monthly alimony awaid was 
ba S."* inadequate to equalise parties' standard of 
^ • ^ } living at time of divorce; ami (.'I) (rial court 
ilfoi* c u w ^ ««Cua« to »|H«vttUU »\«ou\ hypo\hett-
future las couseiprerices of propeily 
ision pursuant to tlivorce. 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and 
flif W U M 
I1;rj- remanded. 
iljjil Hcurli, J , concurred In 
T't^i W 
awi i. Dlvoice <-»237 
Alimony was erroneously based on pr*« 
separation standartl of living and should 
£J have been based on standard of living tlur-
\. lug the marriage up lo lime of divorce trial 
•H-", shout two years after separation; during 
'iiijfj; that two year period, husband's income 
jj'* doubled because another airline purchased 
husband'* employer, and husband's ability 
lo tako advantage of thai change in part 
IIOUTIJ, t. IIOU'LI I. Ulah | 2 0 9 
c>i#*«»o« r.*A uv> {uuKAri*. r»»0 
as dale of separation, if one parly has 
acted obstructively. 
3. Divorce 4-217 
Determining standard of living in or* 
tier In net alimony after divorce i« fael sen* 
pitive, suhjectift* tusk ami is not determined 
by actuul expenses alone. 
4. Divorce *--»M5 
Trial courts have discretion In deter-
mine standard of living which existed dur-
ing marring? after consideration of rele-
vant facts and equitable p» imiples. 
5. Divorce «S^ 2.17 
Trial courts must consider the follow-
ing factors in setting alimony after divorce: 
financial conditions and needs of recipient 
rpouse, recipient's ability to produce in-
come, and ability of payor spouse lo pro 
vide support. 
6. Divorce *=2I0(2) 
Trial court selling alimony after di-
vorce should first determine financial needs 
and resources of both parlies and should 
set alimony as permitted b> those parame-
ters to approximate parties' standartl of 
living during martiage as closely »<t pnssi 
hie. 
7. Divorce «-»2lum 
If payor spouse's resources are ade-
quate, alimony following divorce need not 
be limited to provide for only hitMc needs, 
but thnuld AIM* consider recipient spouse's 
station hi life. 
8. Divorce 4^2.19 
Trial court setting alimony after di 
vorce must make findings on all material 
issues. 
9. Divorce «=>2.19, 28fi(9) 
Trial court's failure lo make findings 
on all issues material to setting alimony 
after divorce constitutes revrrsihle error. 
part, dissented 
yresulted from perseverance during lean unless pertinent facts in record are clear, 
uueontroverted, and capable of 6iippoiting 
only finding in favor of judgment. 
tii 
.11 
j t2. Divorce *-253<3) 
jj1 Value of marital property is deter-
mined as of lime of divorce decree or at 
10. Divorce «=>2I0(I) 
Monthly alimony award of $1,800 was 
]'trial, but courts can, in exercise of (heir inadequate (o equalize abilities of former 
i t » . 
equitable powers, use different date, such wife and former husband lo go forward 
